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COURT ACTIONS CONTESTING THE
NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE OF DEEDS OF
TRUST IN WASHINGTON
The Washington Deed of Trust Act was enacted in 19651 to provide an
alternative to the state's outmoded mortgage foreclosure process. The Act
authorizes the foreclosure of deeds of trust without court action. 2 This
nonjudicial foreclosure process makes it easier for a lender to realize on a
security interest in real property following a debtor's default. For this rea-
son, deeds of trust have supplanted mortgages as the dominant real prop-
erty security device in Washington. 3
Despite the prevalence of deeds of trust in real property financing,
Washington law concerning the nonjudicial foreclosure of deeds of trust
is still in a developmental stage. Prior to 1965, nonjudicial foreclosure
was prohibited by statute. 4 Therefore, Washington courts were not called
upon to decide cases involving nonjudicial foreclosure until recently.
Very few of these cases have reached the appellate courts.
Significant rights and interests are at stake in most nonjudicial foreclo-
sure cases. The debtor stands to lose all rights in the property, 5 including
1. 1965 Wash. Laws ch. 74, §§ 1-13 (codified as amended at WASH. REv. CODE §§
61.24.010-. 130 (1983)).
2. The Act specifically authorizes a private trustee to exercise the power of sale contained in the
deed of trust.
3. An unofficial survey revealed that on March 1, 1984, for example, 615 deeds of trust were
recorded in King County as compared with only 17 mortgages. Daily General Index, Indirect, Re-
cording and Filing Office, Records Section, King County Records and Election Division (Mar. 1,
1984).
Mortgages, however, remain the dominant real property security device in the agricultural area.
This is because mortgage law permits a debtor to redeem his or her property at any time within one
year after the foreclosure sale, WASH. REv. CODE § 6.24.140 (1983), while the Deed of Trust Act
expressly denies postsale'redemption rights. Id. § 61.24.050 (1983). Postsale redemption rights are
particularly important in the agricultural area because losses from a single crop failure may temporar-
ily force a farmer into default. The use of mortgages to secure agricultural loans ensures that farmers
will not permanently lose their properties as the result of a single crop failure.
4. WASH. Rev. CODE § 7.28.230 (1983). In 1965, the Deed of Trust Act created an exception.
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88 Wn. 2d 718,
724-25, 565 P.2d 812, 816 (1977). Deeds of trust could be foreclosed nonjudicially in the Washing-
ton Territory prior to 1869, but the remedy was apparently never used. See id. at 724, 565 P.2d at
815-16.
5. See Gose, The Trust DeedAct in Washington, 41 WASH. L. REv. 94, 101 (1966).
The issue of whether homestead rights survive the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust was
accepted for review by the Washington Supreme Court in the case of Felton v. Citizens Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, No. 49070-8 (Wash. Sup. Ct. argued Nov. 29, 1983). As this Comment went to print,
the court had not yet filed a decision in Felton. The Washington homestead statute exempts home-
steads from attachments, executions, and forced sales. WASH. REv. CODE § 6.12.090 (1983); see also
WASH. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 ("The legislature shall protect by law from forced sale a certain portion
of the homestead and other property of all heads of families."). The homestead statute provides an
exception to the homestead exemption for executions and forced sales "in satisfaction of judgments
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the right of redemption, 6 while the lender stands to lose a valuable secu-
rity interest. 7 Yet the dearth of reported opinions has left the Washington
courts without guidance in deciding cases arising under the Deed of Trust
Act. As a result, recent decisions have been based on ad hoc interpreta-
tions of particular portions of the Act, 8 or on speculative notions of legis-
lative intent, 9 rather than on broader policy considerations.
The basic objectives of Washington real property law and of the Deed
of Trust Act can be achieved only through a systematic approach to court
actions contesting the nonjudicial foreclosure of deeds of trust. This
Comment proposes judicial interpretations and legislative amendments
designed to maintain the efficiency of the nonjudicial foreclosure process
while enhancing both the fairness of the process and the stability of the
land title system.
I. DEED OF TRUST LAW IN WASHINGTON
The deed of trust is a three-party real property security device involv-
ing the debtor (or "grantor"), the lender (or "beneficiary"), and the trus-
tee. 10 Under the Washington Deed of Trust Act, the deed of trust is
treated as a species of mortgage with a power of sale in the trustee. I1
obtained . . . on .. .mortgages on the premises." WASH. REV_ CODE § 6.12.100(2) (1983). The
statute, however, does not contain an exception to the homestead exemption for trustees' sales under
the Deed of Trust Act, probably because it was felt that the elimination of redemption rights in nonju-
dicial foreclosures under the Act would also eliminate homestead rights. See Gose, supra, at 101
n.67.
A statutory exception to the homestead exemption for trustees' sales is not necessary, however,
because a trustee's sale is not a "forced sale." See Morris v. Marshall, 305 S.E.2d 581,587-88 (W.
Va. 1983). By executing a deed of trust, the debtor consents in advance to the exercise of the power
of sale by the trustee upon default. See id. Because the homestead statute only exempts the homestead
from attachments, executions, and forced sales, the homestead exemption should not apply to trust-
ees' sales. It is hoped, therefore, that the Washington Supreme Court will hold that homestead rights
do not survive the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust.
If the court holds that the homestead exemption applies to trustees' sales, and that homestead rights
therefore survive the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust, then the Washington legislature
should amend WASH REV CODE § 6.12.100 to provide an exception for trustees' sales.
6. WASH. REV CODE § 61.24.050 (1983); see Gose, supra note 5, at 101.
7. An action contesting the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust is often combined with an
action to quiet title, thus placing the lender's security interest in jeopardy. See Kennebec, Inc. v.
Bank of the West, 88 Wn. 2d 718, 719, 565 P.2d 812, 813 (1977) (constitutional challenge to Deed
of Trust Act combined with action to quiet title).
8. See Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn. App. 302, 304, 584 P.2d 983. 985 (1978) (trustee
need not exercise "due diligence" in providing notice of trustee's sale to debtor because Deed of
Trust Act does not expressly require "due diligence").
9. See McPherson v. Purdue. 21 Wn. App. 450, 452, 585 P.2d 830, 831 (1978) (trustee need not
disclose defects in title to prospective purchasers at trustee's sale because disclosure would involve
greater time and expense, thus contravening purpose of Deed of Trust Act).
10. Gose, supra note 5, at 96.
11. Rustad Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Waldt, 91 Wn. 2d 372, 375-76, 588 P.2d 1153, 1154
Nonjudicial Foreclosure of Deeds of Trust
Upon default by the grantor, the beneficiary may either foreclose the deed
of trust judicially, as a mortgage, 12 or direct the trustee to commence the
nonjudicial foreclosure process.13 Nonjudicial foreclosure is usually more
efficient than judicial foreclosure. 14 By choosing nonjudicial foreclosure,
however, the beneficiary waives the right to a deficiency judgment. 15
The trustee conducts the nonjudicial foreclosure process, 16 which cul-
minates in the trustee's sale. If the proper procedures are followed, the
trustee's sale cuts off all rights of the grantor, successors in interest, and
junior lienors in the property,17 including redemption rights. 18 Therefore,
the purchaser at the sale immediately acquires title' 9 and, after twenty
days, may bring an action for unlawful detainer to gain possession of the
property. 20
(1979). Under the "lien theory" of mortgages, which prevails in Washington, a mortgage does not
convey title but merely creates a lien, or security interest, in the mortgagee. Because the deed of trust
is considered a species of mortgage in Washington, it does not convey title to the trustee, but merely
creates a lien in favor of the beneficiary. In California, also a lien theory state, the deed of trust is not
considered a species of mortgage. Instead, deeds of trust differ from mortgages in that deeds of trust
convey title to the trustee. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHrrMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 1.6, at 11-13 (3d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as OSBORNE].
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.100 (1983); see Helbling Bros. v. Turner, 14 Wn. App. 494,
496-97,542 P.2d 1257, 1258-59 (1975).
13. The Deed of Trust Act does not specifically provide that the beneficiary may direct the trustee
to commence the nonjudicial foreclosure process. The Act does provide, however, that the trustee
shall resign at the request of the beneficiary. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.010(3) (1983). Therefore, the
beneficiary may replace any trustee who refuses to follow the beneficiary's direction to commence the
nonjudicial foreclosure process.
14. OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.19, at 477.
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.100 (1983). When a deed of trust is foreclosed judicially as a
mortgage, the beneficiary may seek a deficiency judgment. Helbling Bros. v. Turner, 14 Wn. App.
494,497-98,542 P.2d 1257, 1259 (1975).
16. Recent Washington case law indicates that the trustee's duty is limited to performing the bare
requirements listed in the Deed of Trust Act. See, e.g., McPherson v. Purdue, 21 Wn. App. 450,
452-54, 585 P.2d 830, 831-32 (1978) (trustee has no duty to disclose title defects to prospective
purchasers at trustee's sale); Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn. App. 302, 304, 584 P.2d 983,
985 (1978) (trustee has no duty to exercise "due diligence" in providing notice of trustee's sale to
grantor).
17. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.050 (1983). But see discussion ofhomestead rights, supra note 5.
Even the interests of parties who do not receive notice of the trustee's sale may be cut off by the
sale. See Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn. App. 302, 304, 584 P.2d 983, 985 (1978) (failure of
trustee to exercise "due diligence" in providing notice of trustee's sale to grantor held insufficient to
preclude summary judgment against grantor in action contesting sale).
18. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.050 (1983).
19. One of the basic shortcomings of the mortgage foreclosure process in Washington is the fact
that the purchaser at the foreclosure sale does not immediately acquire title to the property. Instead,
the purchaser acquires an inchoate interest that ripens into title after the expiration of the one-year
redemption period. See Gose, supra note 5, at 94-95.
20. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.060 (1983). The provision does not specify which subsection of
the unlawful detainer statute, id. § 59.12.030 (1983), may be utilized by the purchaser to obtain
possession of the property. None of the six subsections is directly applicable. Nevertheless, §
59.12.030(1), which applies to tenants holding over after the expiration of a specified term and which
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Two kinds of claims 21 may be presented in an action contesting the
nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust. 22 Substantive claims challenge
the facts allegedly supporting the foreclosure of the deed of trust. 23
Procedural claims challenge the conduct of the nonjudicial foreclosure
process. 24 The grantor or any other interested party may raise these
claims in court either prior to or following the trustee's sale.
A. Presale Remedies
Prior to the trustee's sale, an action may be brought to enjoin the sale. 25
requires no notice prior to filing of the unlawful detainer action, should be available to the purchaser
for two reasons. First, because the Deed of Trust Act allows the grantor or successor in interest to
remain in possession for 20 days after the sale, id. § 61.24.060, the party in possession after 20 days
is analogous to a tenant holding over after the expiration of a specified term. Second, in most cases
the party in possession had actual knowledge of the foreclosure and needs no further notice prior to
the filing of the unlawful detainer action.
21. A third kind of claim, based on the due process clauses of the United States and Washington
Constitutions, has been rejected by the Washington Supreme Court on the grounds that the nonjudi-
cial foreclosure of deeds of trust does not involve "state action." Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the
West, 88 Wn. 2d 718, 726, 565 P.2d 812, 816 (1977). For an extensive discussion of the constitu-
tional problems of nonjudicial foreclosure, see OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.23-.30, at 497-519.
22. Some commentators distinguish claims that render a trustee's sale "void" from those that
render the sale "voidable." Void sales are ineffective and do not pass title to the purchaser, while
voidable sales are effective but may be set aside until the property is acquired by a bona fide pur-
chaser. See OSBORNE, supra note 1I, § 7.20, at 477-79. The void/voidable distinction is not helpful
in deciding cases involving nonjudicial foreclosure because it is based on the consequences of the
claims raised rather than on the nature of the claims.
23. Examples of substantive claims include claims that the debt was paid or tendered, that the
deed of trust is not in default, or that the deed of trust was obtained by fraud.
24. Examples of procedural claims include claims that notice was not properly provided, that the
trustee's sale was held at an improper place or time, or that collusive bidding depressed the sale price.
25. WASH. REV CODE § 61.24.130(1) (1983); see Hardcastle v. Greenwood Say. & Loan Ass'n,
9 Wn. App. 884, 885-86, 516 P.2d 228, 230 (1973).
A shrewd grantor might attempt to delay a scheduled trustee's sale by filing an action to quiet title
to the property pursuant to WASH. REV CODE §§ 7.28.010-.320 (1983) and, simultaneously, filing a
notice of lis pendens pursuant to WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.320 (1983). The filing of a notice of lis
pendens is authorized in conjunction with any action "affecting the title to real property." Id. A
notice of lis pendens serves as a warning that the title to the property is the subject of pending litiga-
tion. As a practical matter, the filing of the notice of lis pendens would cause prospective purchasers
and title companies to avoid the trustee's sale. Cf. infra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing practical effects of allowing pending injunction action to survive as a cloud over completed trus-
tee's sale). Therefore, the beneficiary would be forced to postpone the trustee's sale until a hearing on
the merits of the quiet title action could be obtained. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
To prevent this evasion of the efficient nonjudicial foreclosure process provided by the Deed of
Trust Act, the Washington legislature should amend WASH. REV. CODE § 4.28.320 to provide that a
notice of lis pendens cannot be filed after the commencement of the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed
of trust covering the property. Between the commencement of the nonjudicial foreclosure process and
the completion of the trustee's sale, the grantor and other interested parties should be limited to the
injunction remedy provided by the Deed of Trust Act.
Until the legislature so acts, Washington courts should be quick to dismiss actions to quiet title
whenever such actions are filed after the commencement of the nonjudicial foreclosure process. Fol-
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The Deed of Trust Act manifests a legislative preference for the presale
injunction remedy by reserving to the grantor, successors in interest, and
other interested parties the right to restrain the trustee's sale "on any
proper ground.' '26
The injunction action consists of two stages: the temporary injunction
and the permanent injunction. The grant of the temporary injunction
merely prevents the trustee's sale from taking place until a full hearing on
the merits of the permanent injunction can be obtained. The grant or de-
nial of the permanent injunction, on the other hand, constitutes the final
resolution of the action. If the permanent injunction is granted, the trustee
is precluded from conducting the sale on the grounds of the particular
alleged default. If the injunction is dissolved, the trustee may sell the
property, either on the originally scheduled date or on a new date set by
the court. 27
The Act specifies only two procedural requirements that must be met
before an injunction against the sale can be granted. 28 First, a party seek-
ing to restrain the sale must give five days' notice to the trustee and the
beneficiary of the time and place of the hearing on the injunction. 29 Sec-
ond, a party seeking to restrain the sale of a single-family dwelling must
lowing dismissal of an action to quiet title, the court should order the cancellation of the notice of lis
pendens upon application of the beneficiary pursuant to § 4.28.320.
26. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.130(1) (1983). None of Washington's neighbor states have provi-
sions in their deed of trust statutes expressly reserving the right to enjoin the trustee's sale. See CAL.
CIV. CODE §§ 2924-2924h (West 1974 & Supp. 1983); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 86.705-.795 (1981);
IDAHO CODE §§ 45-1501 to -1515 (1977 & Supp. 1983); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-301 to -321
(1983). But see, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-13-21 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.34 (1976).
27. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.130(3) (1983).
28. The Act does not, for example, specify the required venue for an action to enjoin a trustee's
sale. The proper venue for an injunction action is generally the county of the defendant's residence.
This is because injunction actions are equitable in nature, and equity acts in personam. State ex rel.
Martin v. Superior Court, 97 Wash. 358, 371, 166 P. 630, 634 (1917); L. ORLAND, 2 WASHINGTON
PRAcTIcE § 43(2), at 74 (3d ed. 1972). When an action to enjoin a trustee's sale is combined with an
action to quiet title, however, the proper venue may be the county where the property is located. The
venue problem is further complicated by the statutory requirement that the trustee notify the grantor
or successor in interest of the proper venue for an action contesting nonjudicial foreclosure. See
WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.040(2) (1983). The Washington legislature should resolve the venue prob-
lem by amending the venue statute, id. § 4.12.010(1) (1983), to provide that actions contesting non-
judicial foreclosure must be brought in the county where the property is located. This would be con-
sistent with the proper venue for mortgage foreclosure actions.
The Act also fails to specify the required parties for an action to enjoin a trustee's sale. Neverthe-
less, the grantor should name both the beneficiary and the trustee in such an action. If only the trustee
were named, the beneficiary would not be subject to the injunction and could foreclose the deed of
trust by appointing a successor trustee. See supra note 13.
29. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.130(2) (1983). The Act also prohibits the grant of an injunction
absent proof of service on the trustee. Id. It is unclear whether the proof of service provision adds
anything to the requirement that the trustee and the beneficiary receive five days' notice of the hearing
on the injunction.
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post a bond of "at least" $250.30 An ambiguous clause in the Act seems
to require that the amount of the bond also include the entire unac-
celerated amount in default. 31
Only one reported case in Washington has resulted in the grant of an
injunction against a trustee's sale. 32 In Hardcastle v. Greenwood Savings
& Loan Association,33 the Washington Court of Appeals upheld the grant
of a permanent injunction because the beneficiary had "both created and
maintained the conditions which made it impossible for [the grantor] to
comply with the terms of the deed of trust. ,34 The court, however, failed
to define the general scope of the injunction remedy or give meaning to
the statutory phrase "on any proper ground." 35
B. Postsale Remedies
Following the trustee's sale, the remedies available to the grantor in-
30. Id. § 61.24.130(1). The injunction bond provision was added to the Act in 1975. Act of May
31, 1975, ch. 129, § 6, 1975 Wash. Laws 478, 487. The provision was intended to limit the amount
of the injunction bond in connection with the sale of a single-family dwelling. Leen & Gose, Non-
Judical [sic] Deed of Trust Forclosures [sic], WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, July-Aug. 1975, at 36,
39-40. The provision was amended in 1981. Act of May 14, 1981, ch. 161, § 8, 1981 Wash. Laws
787,797.
31. WASH REV. CODE § 61.24.130(1) (1983). The clause provides:
[T]he court shall require as a condition of continuing the restraining order that the party seeking
to restrain the sale shall pay to the clerk of the court the sums that would be due on the obligation
secured by the deed of trust if the deed of trust was not being foreclosed. In the case of a default
in making the monthly payment of principal and interest and reserves, such sums shall be the
monthly payment of principal, interest, and reserves paid to the clerk of the court every thirty
days.
There are at least three possible interpretations of the clause. First, the amount of the bond might
include the entire unaccelerated amount allegedly in default, along with the payments due after the
restraining order is issued. Second, the amount of the bond might include only the amount admittedly
in default, along with the payments due after the restraining order is issued. Third, the amount of the
bond might include only the payments due after the restraining order is issued. For a general discus-
sion of tender requirements, see OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.22, at 491-92.
32. The Washington Supreme Court recently reversed the grant of an injunction against a trus-
tee's sale in Mahalko v. Arctic Trading Co., 99 Wn. 2d 30, 659 P.2d 502 (1983). The court of
appeals had granted the injunction to allow the purchaser at an execution sale of the property to
establish her title. Mahalko v. Arctic Trading Co., 29 Wn. App. 411, 414, 628 P.2d 859, 861
(1981), rev'd, 99 Wn. 2d 30, 659 P.2d 502 (1983). The court of appeals held that the title resulting
from the execution sale related back to the date of a judgment preceding the execution of the deed of
trust. Id. The supreme court reversed, holding that the homestead statute precluded the judgment
from attaching to the property. Mahalko, 99 Wn. 2d 30, 35-37, 659 P.2d 502, 504-05 (1983).
33. 9 Wn. App. 884,516 P.2d 228 (1973).
34. Id. at 889, 516 P.2d at 232. The beneficiary had allowed a fire insurance policy to lapse
without notifying the grantor. After fire damaged the property, the beneficiary breached an agreement
to supply the grantor with funds necessary to restore the property to income-producing status.
35. The phrase "on any proper ground" is contained in WASH. REV CODE § 61.24.130(I)
(1983). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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elude bringing an action to set aside the sale, 36 bringing an action for
damages for wrongful foreclosure against the beneficiary or the trustee,37
and defending against an action for unlawful detainer brought by the pur-
chaser of the property. 38 The Deed of Trust Act discourages the use of
postsale remedies in three ways. First, -the Act does not expressly provide
for any court actions to contest a completed trustee's sale. Second, the
Act indicates that the right to contest a completed sale may be waived by
a party's failure to bring a presale injunction action. 39 Finally, the Act
requires that the trustee's deed issued to the purchaser "recite the facts
showing that the sale was conducted in compliance with all of the require-
ments" of the Act and the particular deed of trust.40 This recital of statu-
tory compliance is "prima facie evidence of such compliance and conclu-
sive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers
for value. '41
36. See Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn. App. 302, 303, 584 P.2d 983, 985 (1978).
37. See id. The availability of an action for damages against the trustee should be limited to
situations involving the trustee's alleged failure to perform a statutory duty. In all other situations, the
proper remedy is an action for damages against the beneficiary.
38. But see Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Ostrander, 6 Wn. App. 28, 491 P.2d 1058 (1971), in which
the court indicated that a defense to foreclosure that arises prior to the date of the trustee's sale may
not be raised for the first time in an unlawful detainer action.
As a fourth postsale remedy, the grantor may file a bankruptcy petition within one year after the
sale and seek to have the sale avoided as a fraudulent transfer. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1982). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has upheld such an avoidance when the property sold for
less than 70% of its market value. See Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir.
1980) (applying § 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, sec. 1, § 67(d), 52
Stat. 840, 877 (previously codified at I 1 U.S.C. § 107(d) (partially repealed and renumbered effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1979))). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has thus far declined to address
the issue of whether a trustee's sale can be a fraudulent transfer under federal bankruptcy law. See
Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 426 (9th Cir. 1982). The possible use of federal
bankruptcy law to set aside a completed trustee's sale is discussed in Coppel & Kann, Defanging
Durrett: The Established Law of "Transfer," 100 BANKING L.J. 676 (1983).
39. The notice of trustee's sale mandated by the Act contains the following language:
Anyone having any objection to the sale on any grounds whatsoever will be afforded an opportu-
nity to be heard as to those objections if they bring a lawsuit to restrain the sale pursuant to RCW
61.24.130. Failure to bring such a lawsuit may result in a waiver of any proper grounds for
invalidating the trustee's sale.
WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.040(l)(f) (1983). The Act provides that the notice of trustee's sale must be
(I) recorded, (2) posted on the property or personally served on the occupant, (3) published in a legal
newspaper, (4) mailed to all persons with an interest in or a lien or claim of lien against the property,
(5) mailed to all persons who have filed a court action to foreclose on the property, and (6) mailed to
all persons who have requested such notice in writing to the trustee. Id. § 61.24.040(1), (3).
40. Id. § 61.24.040(7).
41. Id. In Johnson v. Johnson, 25 Wn. 2d 797, 172 P.2d 243 (1946), the Washington Supreme
Court construed a similar recital of statutory compliance in a California trustee's deed. The court
stated that the purpose of the recital "undoubtedly was to protect innocent third persons purchasing at
the trustee's sale, and not the beneficiary of the trust who purchased at the sale." Id. at 804, 172 P.2d
at 247. Therefore, the recital created only a rebuttable presumption of procedural validity when in-
voked by the beneficiary, who had purchased the property at the trustee's sale.
Washington Law Review
No reported case in Washington has resulted in the invalidation of a
completed trustee's sale 42 or in an award of damages for wrongful fore-
closure of a deed of trust. Moreover, the Washington Court of Appeals
has expressed a general disfavor with postsale remedies. In Peoples Na-
tional Bank v. Ostrander,43 the grantor of a deed of trust did not seek to
enjoin or invalidate the trustee's sale but instead attempted to defend
against the unlawful detainer action brought by the purchaser. The gran-
tor alleged that the deed of trust had been obtained by fraud. The court of
appeals did not permit the grantor to raise his defense to foreclosure, stat-
ing that "[t]o allow one to delay asserting a defense until this late stage of
the proceedings would be to defeat the spirit and intent of the trust deed
act.' 44
II. COURT ACTIONS CONTESTING THE NONJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE OF DEEDS OF TRUST-A SYSTEMATIC
APPROACH
A proper approach to court actions contesting the nonjudicial foreclo-
sure of deeds of trust should further three basic objectives. First, the non-
judicial foreclosure process should remain efficient and inexpensive. 45
Second, the process should provide an adequate opportunity for interested
parties to prevent wrongful foreclosure. 46 Third, the resultant land titles
should be stable. 47
These objectives are often difficult to reconcile. For example, requiring
a summary hearing prior to every deed of trust foreclosure would provide
42. In Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn. App. 302, 584 P.2d 983 (1978), the court of
appeals reversed a grant of summary judgment for the defendants, who included the trustee and the
purchaser at the sale, and remanded for trial on the issue of whether the trustee's sale should be set
aside.
43. 6 Wn. App. 28,491 P.2d 1058 (1971).
44. Id. at 32, 491 P.2d at 1060.
45. One of the original goals of the Deed of Trust Act was to provide an alternative to the time-
consuming mortgage foreclosure process and save substantial time and money for both the borrower
and the lender. See id. at 31, 491 P.2d at 1060; Gose, supra note 5, at 94-96.
46. The Washington Supreme Court has stated that " it is imperative that all citizens be afforded
effective access to our justice machinery to redress their grievances." Carter v. University of Wash.,
85 Wn. 2d 391, 394, 536 P.2d 618, 621 (1975), overruled on other grounds, Housing Auth. v.
Saylors, 87 Wn. 2d 732, 738-42, 557 P.2d 321, 325-27 (1976).
In a mortgage foreclosure action, it is improper for a court to enter a foreclosure decree prior to a
hearing on the merits of the debtor's defenses to foreclosure. Lewis County Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Black, 60 Wn. 2d 362, 370-71, 374 P.2d 157, 163 (1962). When the Deed of Trust Act was enacted,
the intent was that deeds of trust would offer debtors the same protections as mortgages. See Gose,
supra note 5, at 104.
47. See Graves v. Elliott, 69 Wn. 2d 652, 656, 419 P.2d 1008, 1011 (1966). See generally
OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.19, at 477 (land titles produced by nonjudicial foreclosure have proven
less stable than those produced by judicial foreclosure).
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a fair opportunity to prevent wrongful foreclosure, 48 but would destroy
the efficiency of the foreclosure process. 49 Similarly, allowing an unlim-
ited right to contest a completed trustee's sale would provide a fair oppor-
tunity to challenge a wrongful foreclosure, 50 but would produce instabil-
ity in the land title system. Finally, restricting both presale and postsale
remedies would maintain efficiency and the stability of the land title sys-
tem, but would not provide a fair opportunity to prevent wrongful fore-
closure.
In order to further all three objectives, the presale injunction remedy
should be made more freely available and the use of postsale remedies
should be restricted. This approach would maintain the efficiency of the
nonjudicial foreclosure process by permitting deed of trust foreclosures
without a mandatory prior hearing. At the same time, it would provide a
fair opportunity for interested parties to prevent wrongful foreclosure
through the injunction action. Finally, it would preserve the stability of
the land title system by restricting the use of postsale remedies. The sug-
gested judicial interpretations and legislative amendments that follow are
designed to further these desired objectives.
A. A Systematic Approach to Presale Remedies
1. Demonstrating Grounds for a Temporary Injunction
In an action to enjoin a trustee's sale, the grantor or other interested
party usually first seeks a temporary injunction. 51 In general, a party
seeking a temporary injunction must demonstrate (1) a clear legal or equi-
table right to relief, (2) a well-grounded fear of invasion of that right, and
(3) actual and substantial injury as a result of the invasion. 52
The greatest obstacle facing a grantor seeking to temporarily enjoin a
trustee's sale is the requirement that he or she demonstrate a clear legal or
equitable right to relief.53 The Washington courts have held that, in order
48. In North Carolina, for example, a summary hearing before a clerk of the court is required
prior to every deed of trust foreclosure. N.C. GEN4. STAT. § 45-21.16 (Supp. 1981).
49. For this reason, a proposal to require a hearing prior to every deed of trust foreclosure was
rejected by the Washington legislature in 1974. See Leen & Gose, supra note 30, at 36.
50. In Texas, for example, a completed trustee's sale may be contested up to 10 years after the
recording of the trustee's deed. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5523a (Vernon 1958); see Calverly v.
Gunstream, 497 S.W.2d 110, 113-14 (Tex. 1973).
51. Under the Deed of Trust Act, the trustee's sale may take place any time on or after 190 days
from the date of the default. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.040(8) (1983). Due to delays caused by
congested court calendars, a temporary injunction is usually required to prevent the trustee's sale
from taking place before the final resolution of the injunction action.
52. Port of Seattle v. International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 52 Wn. 2d 317,
319, 324 P.2d 1099, 1101 (1958).
53. The grantor should have little difficulty demonstrating the other two requirements for a tem-
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to meet this requirement, a party seeking a temporary injunction must
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. 54 According to the
Washington Supreme Court, an injunction "will not issue in a doubtful
case." 55 In one case, even the presence of a " 'substantial' constitutional
question" was held insufficient to meet the requirement of a clear legal or
equitable right to relief.56
The Washington courts have also emphasized, however, that all of the
requirements for a temporary injunction must be examined in light of the
relative interests of the parties. 57 In the context of nonjudicial foreclo-
sure, such an examination reveals that a foreclosing beneficiary often
stands to lose little if the court issues a temporary injunction pending a
full hearing on the merits. 58 In contrast, if the court does not issue the
temporary injunction, the grantor loses the opportunity to prevent the
trustee's sale and, under certain circumstances, may not be permitted to
contest the completed sale. 59 Furthermore, even if postsale remedies are
available, those remedies may be inadequate substitutes for the presale
injunction remedy. 60 Therefore, in considering whether to issue a tempo-
rary injunction against a trustee's sale, a court should weigh carefully the
relative interests of the parties and, in many cases, reduce the grantor's
burden of proof concerning the existence of a clear legal or equitable right
to relief. 61
porary injunction. The pending trustee's sale is evidence of the well-grounded fear of invasion. The
risk of losing the property is evidence of the actual and substantial injury as a result of the invasion.
54. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 96 Wn. 2d 785, 793-94, 638 P.2d 1213,
1217-18 (1982).
55. Isthmian S.S. Co. v. National Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 41 Wn. 2d 106, 117, 247
P.2d 549, 556 (1952).
56. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. State Dep't of Revenue, 96 Wn. 2d 785. 793-94. 638 P.2d 1213,
1217-18 (1982).
57. Id. at 792, 638 P.2d at 1217.
58. Although the beneficiary stands to lose the use of either the property or the proceeds of the
trustee's sale during the pendency of the temporary injunction, the injunction bond should indemnify
the beneficiary against losses resulting from a wrongful injunction. See infra text accompanying notes
62-69. Only if the injunction bond is waived or reduced by the court can the beneficiary be signifi-
cantly harmed by the grant of the temporary injunction. See infra text accompanying notes 70-72.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 73-91.
60. See Nevada Escrow Serv., Inc. v. Crockett, 91 Nev. 201,533 P.2d 471, 472 (1975).
61. The standard for determining whether to issue the temporary injunction may also depend on
the kind of claim raised by the grantor. For example, if the grantor claims that the beneficiary refused
proper tender of the amount due, the court may be able to determine the "likelihood of success on the
merits" with relative ease. On the other hand, if the grantor claims that the deed of trust was obtained
by fraud, the ultimate outcome may be less clear. In such a case, a less strict standard for demonstrat-
ing a "clear legal or equitable right to relief" may be appropriate. See id. When there is a substantial
possibility that the grantor has a valid defense to foreclosure, the beneficiary's interest in efficiency
should not prevail over the grantor's interest in a full hearing on the merits.
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2. Amount of the Temporary Injunction Bond
Once the grantor has demonstrated the requisite grounds for the issu-
ance of a temporary injunction, he or she must post an injunction bond.62
The injunction bond is designed to indemnify the enjoined party against
damages resulting from a wrongful temporary injunction. 63 The bond re-
quirement discourages abuse of the temporary injunction remedy .64 In the
context of nonjudicial foreclosure, however, the bond requirement should
be modified in two ways.
First, the courts should construe the ambiguous clause in the bond pro-
vision of the Washington Deed of Trust Act65 in. a manner consistent with
legislative intent. According to the primary drafters of the provision, 66
the intent was that the amount of the injunction bond in an action to pre-
vent the sale of a single-family dwelling be equal to the sums due on the
obligation secured by the deed of trust between the commencement of the
nonjudicial foreclosure process and the final resolution of the injunction
action, 67 plus costs and other expenses likely to be sustained by the bene-
ficiary. 68 The injunction bond was not intended to include any sums due
on the obligation secured by the deed of trust prior to the commencement
of the nonjudicial foreclosure process. Under the Deed of Trust Act, the
foreclosing beneficiary must look solely to the property for satisfaction of
the obligation, 69 and therefore should not be allowed to treat sums due
prior to the commencement of the foreclosure process as damages result-
ing from the temporary injunction.
Second, the legislature should amend the statutory bond provision. Ab-
sent direct statutory authorization, the Washington courts are not free to
waive an injunction bond.70 The statutory bond provision is thus suscepti-
ble to attack on equitable and possibly constitutional grounds. 71 The leg-
62. WASH. SUPER. Cr. C1v. R. 65(c); Swiss Baco Skyline Logging Co. v. Haliewicz, 14 Wn.
App. 343, 345-47,541 P.2d 1014, 1015-17 (1975).
63. SwissBaco, 14 Wn. App. at 345,541 P.2d at 1016.
64. Id.
65. WASH. REV. CODE § 61;24.130(1) (1983); see supra note 31.
66. The provision was a compromise between the lenders, represented primarily by John A.
Gose, and the Legal Services lawyers, represented primarily by David Leen. See Leen & Gose, supra
note 30, at 36-37.
67. Id. at 40.
68. Such costs might include, for example, the cost of advertising the rescheduled trustee's sale
and a fair rate of interest on the amount likely to be realized by the beneficiary from the trustee's sale.
69. By electing to foreclose nonjudicially under the Act, the beneficiary waives the right to a
deficiency judgment against the grantor. WASH. REv. CODE § 61.24.100 (1983).
70. Irwin v. Estes, 77 Wn. 2d 285,286,461 P.2d 875,876 (1969).
71. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). At least one commentator has suggested
that actions to quiet title may be within the class of fundamental, state-controlled interests protected
under Boddie. See Comment, The Right of Access to Civil Courts by Indigents: A Prognosis, 24 AM.
U.L. REv. 129, 154 n.145 (1974). Actions contesting the nonjudicial foreclosure of deeds of trust
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islature should remove the $250 minimum limit and authorize the courts
either to waive or to reduce the amount of the injunction bond upon a
showing of indigency. 72
3. Necessity for a Temporary Injunction
If the grantor fails to secure a temporary injunction prior to the sched-
uled date of the trustee's sale, the sale may proceed as scheduled. 73 The
Washington courts, however, have not fully explored the consequences
of the grantor's failure to secure a temporary injunction against the sale. 74
An examination of the purposes of the Deed of Trust Act compels the
conclusion that, once the trustee's sale is completed, any pending injunc-
tion action should be dismissed as moot. The grantor's remedies should
be limited to an action to set aside the sale or an action for damages for
wrongful foreclosure.
Allowing the pending injunction action to survive as a cloud over the
trustee's sale 75 would destroy the efficiency of the nonjudicial foreclosure
process. No matter how meritless a grantor's defense to foreclosure might
be, prospective purchasers and title companies would certainly avoid a
trustee's sale held subject to a pending injunction action. Therefore, the
beneficiary would be forced to postpone the trustee's sale until a hearing
on the merits of the permanent injunction could be obtained. 76 This could
mean a delay of a year or longer before the trustee's sale could take
place. 77 In short, if the injunction action were allowed to survive the com-
pletion of the trustee's sale, nonmeritorious injunction actions would be-
come an effective instrument of delay for grantors. The nonjudicial fore-
may also be within the protected class of interests. The fact that nonjudicial foreclosure does not
involve "state action" does not preclude a constitutional attack on the bond requirement, because the
alleged denial of due process is based on lack of access to the courts rather than on a deprivation of
property as a result of the foreclosure by the beneficiary.
72. The requisite showing of indigency could be adapted from Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.
2d 732, 743-44, 557 P.2d 321, 328 (1976).
73. In most cases, the grantor could not possibly secure a permanent injunction prior to the date
of the trustee's sale. See supra note 51.
74. See generally Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Ostrander, 6 Wn. App. 28, 32, 491 P.2d 1058, 1060-61
(1971) (grantor denied opportunity to contest completed trustee's sale as a result of failure to enjoin
sale).
75. See OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.22, at 491.
76. Id. Of course, if the grantor's defense to foreclosure is clearly frivolous, the beneficiary or
trustee may successfully move for summary judgment. However, the presence of any issue of mate-
rial fact would preclude summary judgment and require the beneficiary or trustee to wait for a trial
date.
77. In King County Superior Court, for example, the average wait for a trial date in a civil,
nonjury case is 12 months from the date that the case is noted for trial. Telephone interview with Ruth
Peralta, Deputy Court Clerk, Calendar Control Office, King County Department of Judicial Adminis-
tration (Mar. 6, 1984) (notes on file with the Washington Law Review).
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closure process would be no more efficient than the prior mortgage fore-
closure process.
B. A Systematic Approach to Postsale Remedies
The legislative preference for the presale injunction remedy manifested
in the Washington Deed of Trust Act is consistent with the objective of
preserving the stability of land titles. Nevertheless, postsale remedies are
appropriate in some situations.
1. The Action to Set Aside the Trustee's Sale
There are two primary limitations on the right of the grantor, junior
lienors, and other interested parties to bring an action to set aside a com-
pleted trustee's sale. The first limitation is the doctrine of waiver, 78 which
should preclude an action by a party to set aside a completed trustee's sale
whenever the party (1) received notice of the right to enjoin the trustee's
sale, (2) had actual or constructive knowledge of a defense to foreclosure
prior to the sale, and (3) failed to bring an action to enjoin the sale. In
most cases, the statutory notices of foreclosure79 and trustee's sale80
should be sufficient to inform a party of the right to enjoin the sale. Fur-
thermore, most substantive defenses to foreclosure arise early enough to
permit the filing of a presale injunction action. 81 Therefore, in most
cases, a party's failure to bring a presale injunction action should be held
to constitute a waiver of the right to contest the completed sale.82
However, because waiver can occur only when a party has actual or
constructive knowledge of the right waived, 83 a party should not be held
to have waived the right to contest the completed sale if that party was not
78. Waiver consists of the intentional and voluntary relinquishment of a known right. Bowman
v. Webster, 44 Wn. 2d 667, 669, 269 P.2d 960, 961 (1954). Waiver may be either express or im-
plied. Id. Furthermore, knowledge of the right waived may be either actual or constructive. Id.
79. The notice of foreclosure mandated by the Deed of Trust Act provides:
You may contest this default by initiating court action in the Superior Court of_
County. In such action, you may raise any legitimate defenses you have to this default. You may
also contest this sale in court by initiating court action. . . . Legal action on your part may
prevent or restrain the sale, but only if you persuade the court of the merits of your defense.
WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040(2) (1983).
80. See supra note 39.
81. Substantive defenses based on the validity of the debt or deed of trust generally arise prior to
the commencement of the nonjudicial foreclosure process. Substantive defenses based on the exis-
tence of the default generally arise upon receipt of the notice of default.
82. Cf. Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Ostrander, 6 Wn. App. 28, 32, 491 P.2d 1058, 1060-61 (1971)
(presale injunction action held adequate remedy at law for grantor seeking to contest nonjudicial
foreclosure).
83. Bowman v. Webster, 44 Wn. 2d 667,669,269 P.2d 960, 961 (1954).
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provided with the proper statutory notices84 or was justifiably unaware of
a defense to foreclosure until after the sale was completed. In addition, a
party who unsuccessfully attempted to enjoin the sale should not be held
to have waived the right to contest the completed sale. Under such cir-
cumstances, an action to set aside the trustee's sale may be appropriate.
The second limitation on the right to bring an action to set aside a com-
pleted trustee's sale is the provision of the Deed of Trust Act stating that
the required 85 recital of statutory compliance constitutes "prima facie ev-
idence of such compliance and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of
bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value.' '86 This provision is
self-explanatory. In all cases, the recital of statutory compliance creates
at least a rebuttable presumption that the nonjudicial foreclosure was con-
ducted in compliance with the procedural requirements of the Act. 87
Moreover, once a bona fide purchaser acquires the property, the procedu-
ral validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure cannot be challenged by means
of an action to set aside the trustee's sale. 88 These consequences follow
even if the party seeking to contest the sale had no opportunity to raise the
procedural claims prior to the sale.
The limitations on the right of the grantor, junior lienors, and other
interested parties to bring an action to set aside a completed trustee's sale
reduce the probability that the title acquired by the purchaser at the sale
will be subjected to protracted legal challenges. The limitations thus fur-
ther the objective of preserving the stability of the land title system.
2. The Action for Damages for Wrongful Foreclosure
The action for damages for wrongful foreclosure against the trustee 89
or the beneficiary does not affect the stability of the land title system.
Nevertheless, the doctrine of waiver should limit the availability of such
84. A party who is responsible for the failure of the trustee to provide the proper statutory notices
should be held to possess constructive knowledge of the right to enjoin the sale. This may occur, for
example, when a party moves without providing the trustee with a forwarding address.
85. WASH- REV CODE § 61.24.040(7) (1983); see supra text accompanying note 40.
86. WASH REV CODE § 61.24.040(7) (1983).
87. The presumptions created by the recital of statutory compliance should apply only to
procedural claims. See OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 489-90. But see IDAHO CODE 88 45-1509
to -1510 (1977); MONT CODE ANN. § 71-1-318 (1983) (recital of statutory compliance creates pre-
sumption of existence of default, as well as presumption of procedural validity of nonjudicial foreclo-
sure).
88. Even if the bona fide purchaser later sells or transfers the property to a party who knew of the
procedural defect, the recital of statutory compliance should preclude challenges to the procedural
validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure. Otherwise, the bona fide purchaser would have only a limited
right to sell or transfer the property.
89. But see supra note 37, discussing limitations on availability of an action for damages against
the trustee.
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actions. As with the action to set aside the trustee's sale, the action for
damages for wrongful foreclosure should be available only when the in-
jured party was not provided with the proper statutory notices, was justifi-
ably unaware of the existence of a defense to foreclosure, or unsuccess-
fully attempted to enjoin the trustee's sale. 90
The recital of statutory compliance does not preclude an action for
damages against the trustee or the beneficiary. 91 In fact, when the recital
of statutory compliance precludes an action to set aside the trustee's sale,
an injured party's only remaining remedy is to bring an action for dam-
ages against the trustee or the beneficiary.
The measure of damages in an action for wrongful foreclosure should
depend on the party bringing the action and on the kind of claim raised. If
the grantor, for example, raises a substantive defense to foreclosure, the
damages should be the amount of the grantor's equity in the property at
the time of the sale, reduced by any proceeds the grantor received from
the sale. 92 If the grantor raises a procedural claim, however, the damages
should be the difference between the amount of the outstanding debt and
the price that would have been obtained for the property had the procedu-
ral defect not occurred. 93 The plaintiff in the action for damages for
wrongful foreclosure bears the burden of proof concerning the amount of
damages.
3. The Special Problem of Lack of Notice
The Washington courts have had difficulty resolving postsale chal-
lenges to nonjudicial foreclosure based on the trustee's failure to provide
the grantor, junior lienors, or other interested parties with the proper stat-
utory notices. 94 Some courts have drawn an analogy between a party de-
prived of notice in a nonjudicial foreclosure situation and an omitted party
90. See supra text accompanying notes 83-84.
91. Even if the property is held by a bona fide purchaser when the action for damages is filed
against the trustee or the beneficiary, the recital of statutory compliance would not constitute conclu-
sive evidence of the procedural validity of the nonjudicial foreclosure because it would not be in-
voked "in favor of" the bona fide purchaser. See WASH. Rav. CODE § 61.24.040(7) (1983). There-
fore, the recital of statutory compliance would create only a rebuttable presumption of procedural
validity.
92. See OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.22, at 495; Guay v. Brotherhood Bldg. Ass'n, 87 N.H.
216, 177 A. 409, 411 (1935).
93. This amount constitutes the actual damages sustained by the grantor, since the trustee can
correct most procedural defects by rescheduling the trustee's sale. If the procedural defect is one that
the trustee cannot correct, however, then the measure of damages should be the same as in the case of
a substantive claim.
94. See Equitable Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Yothers, No. 82-2-03943-6, slip op. (Snohomish
County, Wash., Super. Ct., July 11, 1983).
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in a mortgage foreclosure action. 95 These courts have concluded that the
failure of the trustee to provide a party with notice renders the trustee's
sale "void" ,96 with respect to that party. 97
However, this analogy is inappropriate. The purpose of joining all in-
terested parties in a mortgage foreclosure action differs from the purpose
of providing notice to all interested parties in a nonjudicial foreclosure
situation. The joinder of all interested parties in a mortgage foreclosure
action gives the court jurisdiction over the parties and enables the court to
order the foreclosure and sale of the parties' interests. 98 On the other
hand, in a nonjudicial foreclosure situation notice is not a jurisdictional
requirement. 99 Instead, notice serves only to protect the rights of inter-
ested parties. 100 Notice serves this purpose by (1) providing the opportu-
nity for the parties to enjoin the trustee's sale, 101 (2) providing the oppor-
95. This tendency is understandable because deeds of trust are relatively new in Washington
while mortgages have been widely used in the state for over 100 years. See supra notes 3-4 and
accompanying text.
96. A "void" sale does not pass title to the purchaser and can therefore be set aside even against
a bona fide purchaser. See supra note 22.
97. See Equitable Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Yothers, No. 82-2-03943-6, slip op. (Snohomish
County, Wash., Super. Ct.. July 11, 1983).
98. See OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 7.12, at 447. If a party holding an interest subordinate to the
mortgage is not joined in the foreclosure action, the omitted party and the subordinate interest are not
subject to the court's order. See id. § 7.13, at 453. Therefore, as far as the omitted party is concerned,
the foreclosure sale is void and his or her rights are the same as before the foreclosure. See id. § 7.15.
at 459.
99. Because the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust does not require court action and does
not result in a court order, there is no requirement that jurisdiction be established over any of the
interested parties. By executing the deed of trust, the grantor consents in advance to the exercise of
the power of sale by the trustee upon default. Parties holding interests subordinate to the deed of trust
have either actual or constructive knowledge of the grantor's execution of the deed of trust and,
therefore, of the grantor's prior consent to the exercise of the power of sale by the trustee. See I G.
GLENN. MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES AS To LAND § 110.1 (1943).
Constitutional due process does not require that notice of nonjudicial foreclosure be provided to all
interested parties. Because the nonjudicial foreclosure of a deed of trust in Washington does not
involve "state action," the due process clauses of the United States and Washington Constitutions
are inapplicable. Kennebec, Inc. v. Bank of the West, 88 Wn. 2d 718, 726, 565 P.2d 812, 816
(1977); see also Scott v. Paisley, 271 U.S. 632 (1926) (Georgia statute permitting nonjudicial fore-
closure without notice to holders of junior interests held not a violation of due process or equal pro-
tection clauses of United States Constitution).
Many deed of trust statutes do not require that the trustee provide notice directly to all interested
parties. See, e.g., MIss. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55 (1972) (requiring only notice by advertisement and by
posting at courthouse); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3810 (Vernon Supp. 1982) (requiring only
notice by posting at courthouse and by mail to each party obligated to pay debt); VA CODE §§ 55-
59.1 to -59.2 (1981) (requiring only notice by advertisement and by mail to present owner of prop-
erty).
100. See Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21 Wn. App. 302, 307, 584 P.2d 983, 987 (1978).
101. See Comment, Nonjudicial Foreclosure Under a Deed of Trust: Some Problems of Notice,
49 TEX. L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1971).
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tunity for the parties to "cure" the default and "reinstate" the deed of
trust, 102 and (3) helping to, ensure that the property sells for a fair price. 103
Although the rights of the grantor, junior lienors, and other interested
parties deserve the protection provided by notice, the rights of a potential
bona fide purchaser at the trustee's sale also deserve protection. In order
to balance the rights of the grantor, junior lienors, and other interested
parties with the rights of the bona fide purchaser, postsale challenges to
nonjudicial foreclosure based on lack of notice should be resolved in the
same manner as postsale actions based on other claims.
For example, if the lack of notice deprives a party of the opportunity to
raise a substantive claim prior to the trustee's sale, then the doctrine of
waiver is inapplicable and the substantive claim may be raised in an ac-
tion to set aside the sale. 104 The recital of statutory compliance, however,
limits or precludes an action to set aside the sale based solely on the
procedural claim of lack of notice.105 If the property is held by a party
who had actual or constructive knowledge of the lack of notice, then the
recital of statutory compliance creates only a rebuttable presumption of
procedural validity and an action to set aside the sale based on the lack of
notice may be appropriate.106 Once a bona fide purchaser acquires the
property, however, the proper remedy is an action for damages for
wrongful foreclosure against the party responsible for the lack of no-
tice. 107 In such an action, the plaintiff must prove that damages were
sustained as a result of the lack of notice. In most cases, unless the lack of
102. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.090 (1983). The Act provides that the grantor, successors in
interest, and junior lienors may "cure" the default prior to the eleventh day before the trustee's sale
by paying the amount in default plus expenses actually incurred by the trustee in enforcing the note
and deed of trust. If the default is cured, the deed of trust is "reinstated" and the trustee must record a
notice of discontinuance of trustee's sale. The right to cure the default without the necessity of paying
the entire accelerated debt is a significant departure from prior mortgage law.
103. See Comment, supra note 101, at 1086; cf. S &.G Inv. Inc. v. Home Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 505 F.2d 370, 377-79 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (grantor brought action to set aside trustee's sale and
recover damages against trustee because notice of nonjudicial foreclosure was not provided to junior
lienholders, on theory that such notice would have resulted in higher sale price; grant of summary
judgment in favor of trustee and beneficiary affirmed because District of Columbia deed of trust
statute did not require such notice).
104. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text. But see Morrell v. Arctic Trading Co., 21
Wn. App. 302, 304, 584 P.2d 983, 985 (1978) (court rejected postsale challenge based on lack of
notice).
105. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
106. A purchaser at the sale is not precluded from being a bona fide purchaser merely because he
or she has constructive knowledge, through the action of the recording statutes, of the interest of the
party deprived of notice. In order to lose the status of a bona fide purchaser, the purchaser must have
actual or constructive knowledge of the trustee's failure to provide the proper statutory notices.
The beneficiary, however, should be held to possess constructive knowledge of any lack of notice.
This is consistent with the view that the beneficiary cannot be a bona fide purchaser at the trustee's
sale. See supra note 41.
107. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
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notice led to an unusually low sale price, damages should not be
awarded. 108
III. CONCLUSION
The Washington Deed of Trust Act has fulfilled its original promise to
provide an alternative to the state's inefficient and expensive mortgage
foreclosure process. However, as the nonjudicial foreclosure of deeds of
trust becomes more common, the need for a systematic approach to court
actions contesting nonjudicial foreclosure will increase. A freely avail-
able presale injunction remedy, coupled with restrictions on postsale
remedies, will help to accomplish the desired objectives of Washington
real property law and of the Deed of Trust Act. A systematic approach to
court actions contesting nonjudicial foreclosure will ensure that the Act
serves the interests of lenders and debtors alike.
Joseph L. Hoffmann
108. If the party deprived of notice can prove that he or she would have exercised the right to
cure the default and reinstate the deed of trust, and that damages were sustained as a result of the
inability to exercise this right, then an award of damages would be appropriate even though the prop-
erty sold for a fair price.
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